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ABSTRACT: The Liberal Peace can be understood as a discourse and a framework which is 
constantly used by western countries in order to promote political stability in post-conflict 
societies. Embedded in the peacebuilding/peacekeeping operations, some liberal values are 
assumed to be the “only deal in town” to assist war-torn societies reaching political order. The 
present essay aims to analyze what are the theoretical principles embedded in the Liberal Peace 
assumptions and bring a critical approach which contests these universal values of 
implementing peace in transitioning societies. That being said, we can affirm that many values 
regarded as “universal” do not have much meaning to local societies in post-conflict states. The 
essay hence tries to look to an alternative perspective to build the peace in post-conflict 
societies: the hybrid peace. The Hybrid Peace assumption is an important approach which 
assumes that the local agency is a relevant actor on the promotion of peace in their respective 
communities, mainly in post-colonial states. Thus, the local actors have legitimacy and 
recognition of the society and can, therefore, promote and build peace along international 
interveners. The main objective of the present essay is to present a new approach to understand 
the peacebuilding projects and also recognize that different contexts need distinct approaches.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The liberal peace is considered as a discourse, framework and structure, which works at 
the social and state level.  In Western literature and policy discourse, the liberal peace is used 
to reach the “tranquility of order”, mainly in post-conflict societies. This peace framework is 
assumed to be accepted by all, given the fact that it brings values that seek for the maintenance 
or establishment of the negative or positive peace. The main components of the liberal peace 
are the democratization, the rule of law, human rights, free globalised markets and neoliberal 
development in economy. Embedded in the liberal peace values, the “peacebuilding consensus” 
coexists in an international society which advocates for the defense of the components 
mentioned above. Not only states, but also donors, International Organizations, Non-
governmental organizations assume the principles of the liberal peace (RICHMOND, 2006). 
The role of Western states and, mainly, United States in the promotion of the liberal 
peace can be therefore enhanced, given the fact that the world values and order after the Cold 
War was led by a liberal assumption of capitalism’ victory and democratic institutions. The 
peace operations towards domestic wars were the tools to implementation the liberal western 
values in war-torn societies. These peace operations are regarded, in many contexts, as the “only 
deal in town” being the main strategy to international forces to implement a peaceful contexts 
in divided societies.  
Regarding peacekeeping projects, it can be seen that the emergence of transnational 
humanitarian actions and the performance of multinational forces took place prior to the World 
War I, when there were attempts to manage the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. 
Notwithstanding, the occasion that gave rise to the peacekeeping operations occurred in 1956, 
when the UN Emergency Task force (UNEF) supervised the withdrawal of British, French and 
Israeli troops that invaded Egypt after the nationalization of the Suez Canal. However, it was 
with the end of the Cold War that the specific tasks of peacekeeping with liberal values took 
place to secure the peace in domestic conflicts (PUGH, 2004).   
In this context, the end of the bipolarity converted the international wars embedded in 
one of the ideological blocs into regional conflicts of the Third World. The international 
community started to see these conflicts, in the late 1980 and early 1990, as regional or global 
problems that should be settled multilaterally. Thus, there was a consensus conducted by United 
States and others western countries that the newer conflicts were causing an immensurable 
human suffering, death and destruction and hence they required peacekeeping interventions to 
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settle peace and institutions – some examples can be seen in countries such as Somalia, Bosnia, 
and Rwanda.  
However, with the occurrence of the two worst humanitarian crisis in Angola, 1993, and 
Rwanda, 1994, there raised a growing academic and political concern about the peacekeeping 
operations and its universal values in different contexts. Some questions were concerning about 
the fundamental aspects of international interventions and an evaluation about what is effective 
and accountable in conflict interventions was posed. We can affirm that this context allowed a 
growing theoretical review and critics of these universal assumptions carried out by peace 
operations. 
The central critiques towards the peacekeeping – which carried the values of liberal 
peace – focus on the lack of neutrality when performing in different contexts and realities. 
According to Pugh (2004), the peacekeeping in global governance is not neutral and it serves 
the purpose of a pre-stipulated order.  Therefore, the power of decisions is always provided by 
rich powerful states and institutions, promoting their views about many aspects of the social, 
political and economic lives within post-colonial countries. Furthermore, there is also an 
understanding, within the structuralist criticism approach, that these interventions tend to 
destroy the institutional and local capacity of the intra-state actors, given the fact that 
peacebuilding interventions are – in the most of cases – planned as a top-down performance 
(RICHMOND, 2006).  
When intervening in different contexts, peacekeeping does not take into account the idea 
that the local and the global are in constant transformation. There is, in fact, a dichotomy 
between these two worlds – traditional versus modern, western versus non-western and so on. 
Taking these contradictions to the debate about the feasibility of international interventions and 
liberal peace values in domestic states, scholars from the post-colonial studies and Critical 
Theory have developed the notion of a Hybrid Peace and a hybrid political order (BOEGE et. 
al, 2008; MAC GINTY, 2010, BJÖRKDAHL; HÖGLUND, 2013).  The concept of hybridity 
in post-conflict societies appears as a way to rethink the “one size fits all” from liberal peace 
performances. In this model there are spaces to deal and articulate the international order and 
its values as well as non-liberal indigenous institutions, norms and practices at the domestic 
level (LAFFEY; NADARAJAH, 2012). There is, on the Hybrid Peace perspective, a mixed 
order where the locals have strength to represent their culture and traditional values along the 
international performance. In this sense, the issues are specifically treated according to 
customary norms and rules, in order to find a focal point to establish a peace environment that 
represent and is legitimated by the society as a whole (MAC GINTY, 2010).  
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Given the contexts of changes and views in the post-conflict societies and international 
intervention values, the present essay aims to develop a theoretical debate on the core principles 
of liberal peace and the main critiques of these liberal assumptions. Besides that, I contend to 
go further the critical response and present an alternative theoretical perspective known as 
Hybrid Peace Order to present what is the distinct path that scholars have been stressing about 
and delineate its main components. The objective of this essay, therefore, is to understand the 
values of liberal peace and present an alternative view to approach peace operations and 
performances in post-conflict societies in academic field.  To reach this objective, it is important 
guide the investigation under the question: what are the main critiques to the Liberal Peace 
operations and what is the outcome of these analyses to the development of peace building in 
transitioning societies? In sum: we may have critiques to a western political and ideological 
order to build and implement peace; however, what is the alternative approach if this 
perspective does not work completely well in transitioning societies?  
As already shown above and as a part of the hypothesis, we assume that there are some 
values that should not be applied to all cases and there is a relevant need to give voice to 
different perspectives to analyze the governance in the XXI century. Understanding the context 
of the states and local communities and their customary practices, which are being reproduced, 
transformed and legitimized by centuries – mainly in post-colonial states –, is extremely 
important to reach positive outcomes and peaceful environment in international community. 
Above all, we must recognize that there is no predominant order that can determine how peace 
can be built. Instead, policy operations should give attention about the specificity of different 
realities the role of relevant local actors, the customary principles that often are applied to 
political contexts and structures in many post-colonial realities.  
To elucidate the debate and seek for evidences that can contribute to the hypothesis, I 
intend to do, in the first section, a historical lifting about the Liberal Peace concept. In this 
sense, the Liberal Peace is assumed to be a historical outcome of western experience. Moreover, 
on the second topic, I am interested in analyzing the critiques from scholars. Besides that, it is 
important to show what is the theoretical perspective that has been developed on the literature 
of peace operations (which is qualified as a relevant alternative to classical Liberal Peace 
operations) – that is my goal on the third session. The forth, and last topic, has the objective to 
do a brief empirical analysis on the case regarded as most successful in UN’s peacebuilding 
operations, the UNOMOZ in Mozambique, and problematize the features which lead to its 
success to address the debate.  
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II. UNDERSTANDING THE LIBERAL PEACE AND PEACEBUILDING VALUES 
 
The liberal peace is understood as a discourse and structure that was created under the 
peacebuilding and peacekeeping projects to reform governments. The liberal peace has an 
emancipation claim, interpreting peace as a serious research agenda. This peace framework is 
assumed to be accepted by all, given the fact that it brings values that seek for the maintenance 
or establishment of the negative or positive peace. 
The liberal peace discourse has its influence in four debates in International Theory: the 
victor’s peace, (which understands peace as resting on a military victory and in a hegemony 
victory); the institutional peace (resting on liberal-internationalists values where States agree 
on how to behave and how to determine their behavior); the constitutional peace (that lays on 
the liberal Kantian argument, assuming that democracy, free trade and some cosmopolitan 
values may bring peace to the nations) and, finally; the civil peace (which advocates for the 
defense of  basic human rights and values, besides the liberal thinking of individualism and 
human rationality) (RICHMOND, 2006; CHIKIN, 2017). 
Looking back to the theoretical peace debate, it is important to take into account that the 
literature that stresses about peace is not new and, to some extent, it influenced the 
contemporary understanding about what peace is and its application in post-conflict societies. 
Despite there are many classical authors that could be explored in my research, (such as John 
Locke, Stuart Mill, Adam Smith), Kant is one of the most appropriate scholar when we are 
dealing with liberal peace in its classical configuration. Kant promoted the notion of democratic 
peace theory under liberal values and how it should be constituted in the modern European 
states system. In his Perpetual Peace (1795) essay, he proposes three mechanisms that would 
promote and foster the peace among nations and societies: the existence of a Republican 
Constitution; the spirit of commerce with close trade relations among States; and, a federation 
of states. According to Kant, the citizens would decide against war if they realize the cost-
benefit relations in promoting these three aspects of peace. Besides that, in Kant’s reasoning, if 
a country is democratic and engaged in trade and commerce relations, they are unlikely to go 
to war with each other. Thus, they would also externalize their domestic norms to the 
international sphere with other fellow democracies being reciprocal. Therefore, the 
transformation of States in the international order under the democratic peace approach would 
generate a federation of Free states that would abolish war and would have a universal 
hospitality (RICHMOND, 2005; HOWARD, 2001). 
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The Kantian democratic peace thesis would later be reflected in many proponents’ 
studies from western scholars about how to develop a world under a liberal peace optic. These 
scholars would argue that the global peace and security only can be achieved when states are 
liberal democracies (MELLO, 2016; RICHMOND, 2006; TOM, 2017). The term “liberal 
peace” was used for the first time by Michael Doyle in 1983. Doyle found in his empirical 
research test (interstate wars back to 1816) that there was no evidence of wars between two 
liberal democracies. In this sense, it was assumed that democratic and liberal political orders 
had too much to lose by going to war (MIKLIAN, 2014). 
In the end of World War I (WWI) self-determination norm was a reality within the 
international community which made the logic of imperialism and colonialism unfair. Many 
versions of peace were being developed in this period and, in 1910, the Universal Peace 
Congress examined the need for the establishment of international laws, self determination and 
the end of colonialism. Notwithstanding, it was with the entrance of United States (U.S) in the 
war and its consequent political and economic predominance in the international order that a 
general liberal agreement was established. The new order established after WWI was influenced 
by a complementary reasoning of peace, set forth by U.S president Woodrow Wilson 
(RICHMOND, 2006) 
In this context, the Fourteen Points introduced by the Wilson was the decisive document 
which proposed a contemporary notion of peace. The peace was not considered anymore as an 
imperialistic, nationalistic and conservative as in the earlier European Consensus, but it was 
based upon the self-determination of peoples, by no secret agreements between States, and the 
underlying principle that there should be free trade and freedom of seas, besides of a general 
disarmament. Wilson then called for the foundation of the League of Nations that would 
become a tool to promote this liberal peace in the international arena (RICHMOND, 2005). 
However, Wilson’s notion of peace was, in practice, hardly feasible. His vision was based in a 
Platonic ideal and Kantian conceptualization of peace. There was, in this conceptualization, a 
clear contradiction in the understanding of the universal peace once the use of force was 
necessary to promote peace. Additionally, the international community of states was not ready 
to take responsibility to promote and provide the sense of peace build by Wilson’s view. 
After the Second World War the North American consensus held that peace should be 
more institutionalized and defended some international requisites such as: free trade, self 
determination and decolonization. The UN Charter was one of the documents that endorsed this 
peace, creating a new security, political and economic arrangement with Western powerful 
countries. Wilsonian’s peace principles outlined above became more institutionalized in 
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organizations and institutions, seeking to provide military security, legal guarantees, political 
consensus, humanitarian resources, development and financial investment (RICHMOND, 
2005; HOWARD, 2001). 
Nevertheless, it was only after the Cold War that the liberal peace discourse could be 
incorporated in projects from the Western potencies in UN to build a more peaceful world. In 
1990, these efforts were classified by the pillars of republican representation, ideological 
commitment to fundamental human rights and transnational interdependence. 
With the end of the bipolar dispute, there was an international recognition that the 
winner of the ideological conflict was the West – United States – and, therefore, its liberal 
democratic global principles. As Francis Fukuyama (1992) states in his book “The End of 
History”, there occurred, in this political moment, the victory of economic liberalism over 
communism and hence the universal acceptance of the democratic and liberal principles in the 
global field. 
Notwithstanding, the end of the ideological conflict between U.S and URSS and the 
triumph of the Western ideologies and values, were accompanied by the intrastate conflicts 
fostered in the former period. The famine, violation of human rights and violent conflicts in 
developing countries such as Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Kosovo and Angola were a 
problem of global concern. Hence, western countries understood the political fragile reality of 
these countries as a lack of capacity from the State. The Liberal Peace was, therefore, required 
in this moment to foster the development of post-conflict societies. The operations implemented 
in these post-conflict states were the peacekeeping/peacebuilding projects (TOM, 2017; 
RICHMOND, 2005). 
In 1992, the UN head, Boutros Boutros Ghali, introduced “An Agenda for Peace” 
document, seeking for the creation of a post-conflict peacebuilding. The liberal peace policies 
were then led by western countries as path for the implementation of liberal democracies in 
those post-conflict states – given the liberal theory assumption that democracies hardly go to 
war, the need for economic and trade liberalization, and the duty of the developed states to 
assist these vulnerable countries to achieve these goals (TOM, 2017; MIKLIAN, 2004). As 
Boutros states in the document, peacekeeping projects aims to: 
(…) identify at the earliest possible stage situations that could produce 
conflict, and to try through diplomacy to remove the sources of danger before 
violence results; Where conflict erupts, to engage in peacemaking aimed at 
resolving the issues that have led to conflict; Through peace-keeping, to work 
to preserve peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted and to assist 
in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers; To stand ready to 
assist in peace-building in its differing contexts: rebuilding the institutions and 
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infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife; and building bonds of 
peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at war; And in the largest 
sense, to address the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social 
injustice and political oppression (AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, 1992). 
 
Peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations are defined as a compromise based on the 
Liberal Peace values. That being said, we can assume that the dominant form of contemporary 
peacebuilding has its emphasis in promoting liberal values such as: the rule of law, free market 
economy, democracy and protection of individual rights. Despite being regarded as the same, 
it is important to enhance that peacekeeping and peacebuilding are different concepts. The 
former has its roots before the Agenda’s For Peace document. It was in 1956 with the 
establishment of United Nations Task Force (UNEF) when the first mission to keep peace was 
launched to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in the Suez Canal area. At that 
moment, the main role of peacekeeping was to observe, to monitor and to verify the separation 
of force and to control the heavy weaponry under cease-fire agreements.  
After the Cold War and the immanent rise of civil conflicts in the international context, 
peacekeeping became a technique that expanded the possibilities to prevent conflicts and make 
peace after the conflict. The peacebuilding projects, on the other hand, seek to build liberal 
institutions within the post-conflict state such as liberal market economies, democratic 
institutions, free elections, individual rights, rule of law (TOM, 2017; CHIKIN, 2017). 
Since the end of the Cold War, there is a growing acceptance of these liberal 
assumptions and values. State and non-state actors, International Organizations, financial 
groups relies on the liberal assumptions to build peaceful political and social environment. 
Some scholars such as Richmond (2004) and Paris (2004) see this general acceptance as a 
“Peacebuilding Consensus” which is understood as an agreement on the method to create the 
peace. Therefore, this peace consensus created an accordance among actors: (a) the institutional 
approach is predominantly top down. In this sense, international interveners can stress only 
with the political capacity building at the institutional level (examples are the promotion of 
“free and fair elections”; the assignment of political parties; the recovery of parliamentary and 
centralized authority; restitution of the national army, and so on; (b) territorial integrity is, in 
the most of cases, one of the most relevant elements that constitutes the state as a political unity 
in the international arena. In this sense, international powers must assist a State that is losing 
its territorial sovereignty and provide tools to restrain a political collapse or failure; (c) 
delivering basic human rights: it is understood that those societies under domestic conflict need 
international aid to combat diseases, famine and so on; (d) economic changes: international 
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trade and free markets under the liberal economic principles are a primordial feature to the 
maintenance of peace according this consensus.  
About this Peace Consensus, Paris states: 
When faced with the task of postconflict peacebuilding, the world’s leading 
international organizations seemed almost predisposed to adopt strategies 
promoting liberal market democracy as a remedy for conflict. Many of these 
organizations had, in fact, become active and vocal proponents of liberal 
democracy, market-oriented economics, or both, at the end of the Cold War. 
This ideological reorientation took place not only in the United Nations but 
also in other major organizations – including the UN’s specialized agencies, 
the OSCE, the EU, NATO, the OAS, the IMF and World Bank, national 
development agencies, and many international NGOs engaged in relief and 
development tasks – in short, the principal practitioners of peacebuilding. 
(PARIS, 2004, p. 22) 
 
The Liberal peace is not only an academic relevant research area, but it also configures 
a historical debate of western experience as shown above. Historical factors created the 
opportunity to scholars, policymakers and international actors to assume a model of order which 
is the most close configuration to provide peace for a domestic state, to resume, they are: a 
belief on the rationality of human being and, for that, a free and liberalized market which allows 
individuals on the free competition; a trust on democratic principles and on a general 
recognition that democracies do not go to war with each other; the importance of the existence 
of political institutions as well as free competition and representation on political arenas.  
Despite of bringing some important values and principles, the main peace operations in 
post-conflict societies were considered as failures. For instance, cases such as Somalia (1993), 
Rwanda (1993), Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999) were not successful and raised some 
questions about the feasibility of such political projects that carried western values in non-
western societies (CHIKIN, 2017; TOM, 2017). In the past two decades, liberal peacebuilding 
has been under attack due to a wave of academic and political debates about its nature and 
effectiveness on bringing peace. What is the main question and is going to be out next topic of 
discussion is the applicability of these liberal values in post-colonial societies. The question 
that will guide the next section is: how can liberal peace be built in such different non-western 
realities, which carries distinct concepts – or no concepts at all – of the very notion of peace?  
 
III. SOME CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES TOWARDS THE LIBERAL 
PEACEBUILDING VALUES 
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The critiques towards peacebuilding projects agree on the fact that the initiatives to build 
peaceful institutions and a democratic environment in war-torn societies have proved to be 
counterproductive in many cases (PARIS, 1997; RICHMOND, 2006; TOM, 2017). According 
to the Paris (2004), international efforts to transform post-conflict societies, in many cases, have 
exacerbated social tensions and reproduced conditions that fostered violence. His main claim 
is that the liberal peace assumptions have destabilizing effects that might not help some states 
in building the peace. This occurs due the fact that an important feature of democracy and 
liberalism economies are their encouraging effects on competition and conflict. Democracy, for 
instance, has an important aspect in competition given the fact that it is promoted by multiparty 
elections and politically active citizens that are involved in social mobilization and non-
governmental activities. Thus, the fragile circumstances of post-conflict societies may 
undermine any kind of liberal institution, given their lack of governmental institutions to 
manage the effects of liberalization. 
Besides that, there is a lack of knowledge and in-depth analysis on countries that are 
being assisted. Structural critic’s authors state that there is a transplantation of western liberal 
peace values to other parts of the world and, hence, a deep assumption that western powers can 
deliver a sustainable peaceful environment to war-torn non-western societies. The accepted 
assumption then is that once liberalism and democratic values have worked well in western 
societies, it also must be the case in any other context (PARIS; SISK, 2007). Thus, in the 
economic environment, international financial institutions tend to lead reforms involving the 
implementation of policies that lead to deregulation, macroeconomic stabilization and opening 
the domestic market for foreign investment. In the political field, on the other hand, the 
operations tend to push states to promote multiparty elections, writing national constitutions, 
promote the rule of law and politically active mobilized society (TOM, 2017). Some empirical 
examples of these arguments can be seen in Angola – where the early elections renewed the 
violence; Rwanda – when the assumptions about peace settlement were overthrown by 
genocide; Cambodia and Liberia – where the elections were only a superficial democratization 
and returned to authoritarianism and war, respectively (PARIS, 1997). 
Converging with this critical perspective, Taylor (2007) assumes that there is a neo- 
liberal historical bloc where transnational elites promote and seek to achieve the normative 
principles of neo-liberalism. Hence, this group is part of a transnational hegemonic globalism, 
which aims to integrate post-conflict states in the neo-liberal logic towards a developing 
discourse. The liberal peace agenda is deployed, in this context, as a tool to achieve and expand 
the frontiers of neo-liberal globalism, which follow the interest of many powerful actors and 
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states. According to the author, these elites can be constituted by bureaucrats, technicians, – 
who administer International Financial Institutions –, owners of transnational corporations and 
state bureaucracies from the global North. 
Paris (2004) and Taylor (2007) interpret peacebuilding as a social engineering 
experiment in societies that have emerged from civil wars. In transplanting western models of 
social, political and economic organization to non-western post-conflict societies, these 
international actors confirm their belief that there exists only one path to state building and state 
existence: the Modern State. Thus, when non-conforming the Weberian rational bureaucratic 
requisites of modern state, post-conflict states – mainly African states – are not regarded as able 
unities to develop liberal and democratic features required by western states and institutions. 
As Richmond (2004) assumes, the official focus of peacebuilding operations is to create or 
recreate Westphalian sovereign states, considering war-torn societies as failed realities that 
need the western assistance to build a stable and developed society (TAYLOR, 2007; 
RICHMOND, 2004). 
In this perspective, we can assume that peacebuilding operations have some overtones 
of neo-colonialism, given the fact that there is a shared goal to spread the globalization of a 
particular model of domestic governance and economic values from wealthy and powerful 
industrialized democracies to poor and politically weak states from the global periphery 
(RICHMOND, 2004). This approach can be understood, as posed by Paris (2002), by a ‘mission 
civilisatrice’ which, although differs in many aspects, still can be regarded to the colonial belief 
that European imperial powers had the duty and the right to civilize the uncivilized nations. In 
bringing its own perspective of peace and development to poorer countries, the operations of 
peacebuilding are seen with a dual perspective: traditional versus modern, civilized versus 
uncivilized, western versus non-western. 
Additionally, we can say that there are some tensions and contradictions in the peace 
liberal mission itself. Paris and Sisk (2007) question that even though peace operations seek to 
promote national autonomy they tend to intervene in the national sovereignty to promote it, 
through a very intrusive method. Besides that, another issue assumes that the actions of 
international actors seek to legitimate and designate the local leaders, putting these local actors 
as foreigners in their own realities – as with the indirect colonial rule, for instance. Furthermore, 
another dilemma to face is about the incongruities between the accepted universal liberal values 
and the local social practices, traditional institutions and cultural expectations that international 
performance have to deal when working with non-western societies. The problem here is that 
the liberal values are seen, predominantly, as the most effective ones to be applied. Thus, they 
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are intrinsic values for the international interveners and national elites, however, in many local 
societies, they do not mean much to the social and political life. 
It is relevant to state – as many authors of this critical review – that peacebuilding 
operations should not be extinguished. They can be helpful tools to minimize suffering in post-
conflict societies and bring some order degree in social contexts. Some scholars, however, 
question the way the performance is carried out as well as its values. To Paris (2004), it is 
important to delay the introduction of democratic and market oriented reforms until the 
stabilization of domestic structures and institutions, what he calls as the importance to promote 
“institutionalization before liberalization”, as he states:  
What is needed in the immediate postconflict period is not quick elections, 
democratic ferment, or economic “shock therapy” but a more controlled and 
gradual approach to liberalization, combined with the immediate building of 
governmental institutions that can manage these political and economic 
reforms (PARIS, 2004, p. 187). 
 
To other authors, such as Richmond (2013; 2012; 2006), Mac Ginty (2011; 2013; 2010), 
Boege et. al (2008), what is important in international operations is to introduce new approaches 
to promote the peace, to see the national target countries as different political realities with 
distinct political values. Therefore, there is an immediate need to recognize that the 
international liberal values are not universal, and, like this, there are other manners and paths 
to help creating the peace in some non-western realities. In the present essay the perspective 
which better fits to this designation is the hybrid peace concept, which seeks to promote the 
joint action between international interveners and local actors. In this approach, there is a 
necessity to give voice and autonomy to local leaders and actors who understand the traditional 
and customary realities and are the best ones to assist on the promotion of a peaceful 
environment and appropriate institutions. This is the perspective that we will explore in the 
following topic. 
 
IV. THE HYBRID PEACE PERSPECTIVE 
 
The term hybridity is not new since its usage dates back to XIX century regarding the 
botanical field. However, it was in post-colonial studies that the term started to be used with 
the meaning of breakdown of barriers constructed by the colonial powers – in this vision, there 
is a new wave of empowerment of indigenous groups to adopt and adapt the colonial power. 
Within post-conflict societies under peace operations– that are, in many cases, post-colonial 
countries – the term can represent a process of interactions between cultures and values that are 
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assimilated, readjusted and appropriate according to the contexts (MAC GINTY, 2011). To 
start our discussion about the role of the Hybrid Peace perspective in transitioning societies, it 
is important to have in mind that this approach was applied in the peace-construction and 
nation-building field, given the relevant role of local agency in post- conflict societies. 
Mac Ginty and Richmond (2013) define ‘’local’’ as the range of locally based agencies 
that can better identify and create the necessary processes of peace. These agency actors are 
involved in every-day social dynamic and they have, in many cases, the legitimacy of 
understanding the customary practices. The local agency may be seen as a small-scale 
mobilization for peace which acts in the everyday life of social contexts. Sometimes, it is very 
difficult to distinguish this agency, once they are hidden from the international view and act 
through informal networks. For this reason, they might be regarded sometimes as a subaltern 
agency. These local actors are also embedded in a historical context, which can legitimize the 
existence of institutions, identities, values, norms, cultural, economic and political practices. 
According to Boege Et. al (2008), these local structures are, in many national realities, the 
replacement for the national “failed states” structures. For instance, in war-torn societies, the 
only actors who deliver public goods to the people in a specific social context are the individuals 
legitimized by the culture and tradition. Thus, the customary law, traditional social structures 
and traditional authorities can determine the reality of the everyday life in many developing 
countries. 
Given this context, the hybridization approach is important as it shows that international 
liberal peace operations are not the main power nor the ‘only deal in town’ solution to post 
conflict societies. It is important to enhance that many actors involved in peacebuilding projects 
gradually understand that the role of local agency, its participation, its legitimizing effect and 
its power of social mobilization is an important factor in promoting a sustainable peace. In the 
past two decades, there is growing attention to bottom up approaches to peacebuilding 
operations and an increasing need to recognize international policy structures in the promotion 
of these different arrangements of peace (RICHMOND; MICHELL, 2012; MAC GINTY, 
2011). 
In recent years we can see the resurgence of international interest about indigenous 
practices to promote peacebuilding and reconciliations. According to Mac Ginty (2010) the 
customary approaches to solve conflict rely on the socio-cultural environment and all the 
participants tend to respect, understand and connect with the resolutions. Local peacebuilding 
seek for the consensus, respecting the local figures that carry meaning to the community 
beliefs– such as elders, traditional leaders, kings or queens and so on. Thus, the traditional peace 
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promotion tends to have a public dimension where a wide participation is allowed. In this sense, 
decisions are often legitimized and there is a strong emphasis on the relationship in local 
communities, given the fact that the land or the culture unites the families.  
To emphasize the contrast, I already have shown that international liberal peacebuilding 
has an emphasis on top down approaches, seeking to build states institutions instead of working 
with grassroots population. Thus, decisions are predominantly made with national or local elites 
and behind closed doors – which gives few space to communication with the citizens. 
Furthermore, Liberal operations have an ahistorical emphasis, aiming to “put the past behind” 
and rely on external personnel values and resources. Given these context, many scholars have 
attempted on the legitimation of traditional approaches to promote the peace once they are 
within cultural nature. 
 However, Mac Ginty (2011) draws attention to a growing practice of romanticizing the 
local. In this sense, it is important to recognize that traditional cultures may have practices that 
tend to exclusion, degradation and violation of some human rights – women rights, for instance. 
It is in this context that the hybrid perspective raises as miscegenation concept of international 
and local actors. 
  Hybridization is defined as a way in which local agents tend to respond, resist and 
reshape peace initiatives through interactions alongside the international interveners. Hybridity 
means the transmutation of the liberal and the local with transnational and transversal relations 
(RICHMOND; MITCHELL, 2012). This alternative perspective to peacebuilding in post-
conflict societies enables us to go beyond the binary analysis already mentioned: western versus 
non western, international versus local (MAC GINTY, 2011). 
Reassuming Canclini’s (2005) considerations, it is important to understand the term 
hybridity as a dynamic process. Therefore, the current hybridization concept should not be 
regarded as two pure entities being fused together to produce a third result. It must be clear in 
the definition is that both actors – local and international – are already hybridized agents. It 
means that the local actors’ customs, values, institutions and cultural practices are not culturally 
isolated from the global changes. They are, therefore, practices, with multiple sources of 
construction and maintenance. The same must be said about the western values and concepts. 
When hybrid peace is taken into account, international operations and local values are 
considered. Thus, poses Mac Ginty: “While liberalism encourages us to look forward towards 
progressive goals, hybridity demands that we look backwards and ask questions about origins 
and antecedence” (MAC GINTY, 2011, p.76). Working on multiple levels of the social life, the 
hybrid peace demands to international observers to examine the full range of actors involved in 
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peace transitions. This is a two-way process that has an impact on all actors involved. To 
elucidate, in the field of democracy and administration, the international peacebuilding actors 
would seek for compliance or cooperation with the locals through consultation, formations of 
NGOs to aid in democratic programs, to develop political parties – in either liberal lines or 
customary lines – or use their own traditional structures to engage in politics. In the social 
development field, the participation in policymaking and its implementation should be 
guaranteed to locals and be assisted by international actors. In economy, international powers 
would assist using development funds or initiatives to develop local programs using the 
economic development for common benefit. Finally, in the constitutional and legal field, both 
actors would join on the formulation of treaties or constitutional agreements (RICHMOND; 
MITCHELL, 2012). The process is very likely to develop with frictions (BJORKDAHL; 
HOGLUND; 2013), between both forces, however, these interactions of power are positive 
once they can facilitate, after the friction of ideas and values, the changes for both political 
actors.  
Given the previous debate about the concept and definition of hybridity, we can assume 
that it arose as a new important perspective to see peacebuilding projects. International actors 
and its values are not necessarily negative, however, the local actors have an important role to 
contribute once they are able to recognize and redefine some values and assumptions. 
Therefore, we assume that giving voice to local agency and allowing them to take autonomy in 
their own realities is probably one of the best manners to work when building peace.  
 
V. THE MOZAMBIQUE PEACEKEEPING OPERATION: SOME EMPIRICAL 
REFLEXIONS ABOUT THE ROLE OF LOCAL AGENCY 
 
The United Nations Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ) is regarded as one of the 
most successful peacekeeping operations. After 14 years of devastating civil conflict between 
the national government Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) and the 
opposition Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), the former president, Joaquim 
Alberto Chissano, and RENAMO’s president, Afonso Dhlakama, signed a General Peace 
Agreement (GPA) which called for the United Nations participation in monitoring the 
implementation of the Agreement and the settlement of political institutions and multiparty 
elections.  
The UNOMOZ peace operations can be aggregated as the second-generation of peace 
performances given its multidimensional acting in the country. These second generations can 
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be characterized by the development of civilian tasks related to the transitioning context, by 
delivering humanitarian aid, human rights promotion and refugee assistance; taking military 
mandates and ordering the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; organizing elections 
and assisting on the government capacity building. To understand how UNOMOZ operated in 
the Mozambican post-conflict society, it is important to enhance the main causes of the war 
between the two opposite political forces in Mozambique.  
Mozambique gained its independence from colonial Portuguese rule in 1975 and 
FRELIMO, which leaded the national movement for independence, established a single party 
regime with a Marxist-Leninist political ideology platform, in 1977. Notwithstanding, in the 
same year, i.e. two years after independence, Mozambique entered in its civil conflict with 
RENAMO.  
To understand the origins of the conflict, we must understand that at independence, 
FRELIMO established a relationship with the Zimbabwe African National Union of Rhodesia, 
pressuring the Rhodesian white regime and implementing sanctions in order to support the 
movement. Thus, Mozambican government supported the fighters and a political tension was 
raised between Rhodesia and Mozambique.  In 1976 Rhodesia strengthened its propaganda to 
attract Mozambicans seeking to overthrow FRELIMO’s government and establish a Federal 
Democratic Republic of Mozambique. This strategy was successful and attracted defecting 
military personnel from colonial units and from FRELIMO itself. The Rhodesian security 
forces and many political actors such as Matsangaissa and Orlando Cristina formed the 
commando unit called the Resistência Moçambicana (REMO). In 1977, REMO released 
prisoners from Sacudzo re-education camp and they became the core of Rhodesian insurgency: 
RENAMO.  As Rhodesia transformed in Zimbabwe, in 1980, RENAMO was transferred to 
South Africa’s Department of Military Intelligence which provided support with Apartheid’s 
regime in order to grow in size and expand its activities in Mozambique, becoming a real threat 
to FRELIMO’s political authority (MALBROUGH, 2009). The war between the two forces 
ended officially in October 1992 when the leaders signed the General Peace Agreement in 
Rome approved by the Secretary General of an interim Special Representative from UN, which 
sent a team up to twenty five military observers to Mozambique (United Nations, UNOMOZ). 
According Malbrough (2009), the civil conflict ended due a combination of two factors:  
the end of the Cold War and the cease of aid from Soviet Union (in this sense, there was 
replacement from United States and western countries in order to support the construction and 
stabilization of democracy and market economies) and the new 1990’s Constitution drafted by 
FRELIMO where it abolished one-party state and conducted an era of democracy, (undermining 
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RENAMO’s justification and aim to keep the war ongoing). After the civil conflict UNOMOZ 
was an essential to organize Mozambican political, economical and social reconstruction. 
However, international donors were also key players on the process of building stabilization. 
Notwithstanding, the most important factor to Mozambican political and economic 
stability is still regarded to the UN peacekeeping performance. In this sense, The General Peace 
Agreement (GPA) provided a tacit role to UN and western donors to implement and monitor 
peace in the post-conflict state (MALBROGHT, 2009). In november 1992, the Special 
Representative appointed the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission which should guarantee 
the implementation of the Agreement between the opposing forces and settle any disputes that 
could arise between the parties. This commission was chaired by the U.N and had 
representatives from many western countries such as Italy, Portugal, United Kingdom, United 
States, Germany as well as the Organization of African Unity. On December it was presented 
to the UN Security Council the operational plan for the UNOMOZ (UNITED NATIONS, 
UNOMOZ).  
UNOMOZ main tasks were to monitor and verify the cease-fire, separation and 
concentration of forces of the two parties, as well as their demobilization and provide a stable 
environment for democratic elections. Thus, UNOMOZ had an electoral division to monitor 
and verify all aspects of the electoral process, organized by the National Election Commission. 
This commission had function to provide and assist the Mozambican government in electoral 
issues and be the representative and impartial body which organized the parliamentary and 
presidential elections. Besides that, UNOMOZ had extensive operational activities with a wider 
scope throughout Mozambican civil society by providing security for the main roads and aerial 
patrol; to collect arms from the troops and demobilize armies and humanitarian aid.  
In the security field, it is important to enhance that in 1993, the Joint Commission for 
the Formation of Mozambican Defense Force, under U.N chairmanship, approved the Lisbon 
Declaration where western countries – France, Portugal and United Kingdom – developed a 
program to assist on the formation of a new unified army. While organizing the formation of a 
new national army, the Commission also approved 19 documents to the organization, operating 
procedures, uniforms, ranking symbols and training of the unified Mozambican forces. Another 
key role taken by UNOMOZ was the humanitarian assistance, where it provided assistance to 
the reintegration needs of Mozambican society and the returning of individuals to their original 
communities. Besides that, the humanitarian missions provided food and assisted former 
soldiers. (UNITED NATIONS, UNOMOZ; MALBROUGHT, 2009). The UNOMOZ Civilian 
Police component (CIVPOL) was an autonomous branch of UNOZOMOZ which had a major 
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role to monitor all police activities in the country and verity if their actions were following the 
GPA. Alongside UNOMOZ, CIVPOL monitored and assisted the elections to assert if the 
proper conduct of the electoral campaign was being respected; it should, then, verify that 
political rights of individual and groups were being assured.  
The electoral process began in 1 June and was extended until 2 September. The result 
of multiparty elections in Mozambique was announced by the National Election Commission. 
Mr. Chissano from FRELIMO won the presidential elections with 53.3 percent of votes and 
Mr. Dhlakama, RENAMO’s leader, received 33.7 percent of votes. A third party received 2.9 
percent of votes, Mr. Wehia Ripua, from the Mozambican Democratic Party (Partido 
Democrático de Moçambique). In the legislative election, FRELIMO received the largest 
amounts of the votes (44,3 percent), RENAMO was the second party with more seats (37,8 
percent) following Democratic Union (with 5,2 percent). The United Nations and the Special 
Representative considered the elections held in Mozambique free and fair in 1994 (UNITED 
NATIONS, UNOMOZ).  
After the end of civil conflict and the assumed success in Mozambican transition period, 
FRELIMO’s party won all other presidential elections (1994, 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014) as 
well as the majority of seats in Parliament and municipal elections (not without RENAMO’s 
contestation, as can be seen in 1999 and 2009 elections where a series of protests took the 
country and ended on clashes with the police). As discussed earlier and shall be explored in this 
section, peace operations in Mozambique was successful to establish the standard of democracy 
and free market which predominated in western view and values. The bottom up development 
and the concern with ordinary citizen day-to-day lives was, however, left aside.  
Maschietto (2016) assumes that there is a notorious difference between what has been 
promised and, in sort measure, accomplished in the institutional reforms and what has been 
achieved in terms of peace at the everyday level of Mozambican citizens. According her, peace 
was reached mainly at the elite level, given the fact that the major goal from international forces 
was to deal with party’s leadership members and settle a peaceful environment to establish 
democratic elections and a free market economy. The local peace, in contrast, was established 
by non-state actors and communities following some cultural norms. In this sense, the author 
posits what that it was established a “people’s peace”:  
The people’s peace assumed several forms, but it had one common aspect, 
which was the recognised need for reconciliation. Different from South 
Africans, Mozambicans ruled out the option of a truth commission and 
preferred, instead, to focus on forgiveness and social reintegration (Lundin, 
2004 ; Van Den Bergh, 2009). The reasoning for this was the general 
understanding that punishment would only delay peace; and it was very 
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difficult at that stage to clearly separate victims and perpetrators of violence 
(which also included the state). Therefore, the law on amnesty received no 
objection during the negotiations neither from the Mozambican population nor 
from the international community (MASCHIETTO, 2016, p.124) 
 
Thus, the local level was essential for setting village peace agreements, even before the 
signing of GPA by both parties. Regions such as Morrumba in Northern Zambezia settle peace 
trough informal rules ordered by customary practices and principles. In this sense, local rituals 
were taken as a process to consolidate peace and promote reconciliation among people in order 
to reestablish social order (HONWANA, 1996). However, the peace established in subjective 
terms among citizens at local level, where not connected with formal peace, built by 
international institutions and party elites. The primary concern of UNOMOZ and international 
donors where to develop politics, security and political institutions. Hence, some of the main 
day-to-day issues of the population were left behind since there was no consultation with locals 
about how peace was interpreted in their context.   
Besides that, the liberal economic reforms imposed to Mozambique by the IMF during 
the transitioning period were severe, once they demanded cuts in public expenditure and 
economic liberalization. It affected Mozambican population negatively and fostered corruption 
among leaders. The privatization process was extremely fast and did not considered social and 
political aspects of society considering that Mozambique was coming out of a socialist 
experience and did not have a middle class at the transition period. The transitioning period also 
made Mozambique one of the most aid-dependent countries in the world since the period 
opened the country for foreign aid from western countries (CRAMER, 2001). After the 
democratization, the country depends on imports for the most of its consumer goods 
(MASCHIETTO, 2016). 
 As mentioned in earlier sections, liberal values are carried by logic of competition 
among individuals and groups. In this sense democracy became a problematic idea once it is 
based on the institutionalized competition between political forces which were before at war. 
Thus, there is still a power dispute between FRELIMO and RENAMO and this cleavage poses 
a series of limitations to the Mozambican democracy and society wide. The political system, in 
special, has the “winner takes all” model which allows the Executive to hold more political 
power than the legislative branch. Considering these features, it is easy to asses that FRELIMO 
had advantage in this political model and could maintain its political predominance during the 
years. According to Maschietto (2016) the formal institutional reconfiguration of Mozambican 
state shapes it as a still one-party state – de facto but not de jure. RENAMO’s contestation of 
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the system through arms demonstrates the fragility of the institutional features of the 
Mozambican democracy.  
Taking the Mozambican society as a point of departure, the GPA, Rome Accords and 
the many institutional and political changes provided by UNOMOZ and western donors, did 
not bring any proposal to the recomposition and reconstruction of Mozambican society after 
the conflict (MASCHIETTO, 2012). The international performance did not take a role to 
develop Mozambique by a bottom up approach, i.e they did not intend to empower locals and 
understand customary and historical principles to comprehend what kind of peace should be 
built. Western concepts such as democracy, multi-party elections, and separation of powers are 
very distant from the ordinary Mozambicans who lives in local villages and under specifics 
day-to-day structures. The central state authority and the everyday lives were then separated 
and the society could not claim state structures as an effective mean to reach political goods 
and rights provided by democratic principles.  
According Maschietto (2012) the peace dividend has been unequally distributed through 
population and elites in Mozambican context. Following this reasoning, peacebuilding reforms 
did not necessarily took into account the priorities of the local actors and their everyday life 
needs. Indeed the necessities of local people are more related to basic goods than with formal 
democratic institutions. Thus, according the author, the socio-economic aspects are the ones 
which affect the daily lives given the context of extreme poverty.  
 
VI. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
After what was considered, we can affirm that the liberal discourse about peace was a 
historical construction and the outcome of hundreds of years of western states experience. 
Western scholars endorse these values because they are a inseparable part of history of the 
global north. In Kantian perpetual peace vision, peace can only be achieved in international 
arena when all state assumes these western values which are seen as the synonymous of order, 
stability and peace. In this sense, commerce and democracy are the main tools to prevent 
countries from going to war.  
Regarding this, we can also state that the liberal discourse was led to international action 
by the United States preeminence after World Wars and decisively after the Cold War. After 
WWI, the USA could develop a model of peace based in some Kantian principles. The fourteen 
points of Wilson proposed some contemporary notions of peace with embedded values such as 
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democracy, free trade and self-determination. The UN Charter could crystallize these principles 
with the An Agenda For Peace document, proposed by Boutros Gali. 
Given this context we can assume that the liberal peace as a project was led by the global 
north experiences. However, the end of global bipolarity invited these powerful countries to 
implement this model of peace in different realities. Notwithstanding, peace operations that 
attempted the promotion of democracy, free market, free elections in an assumed “peace 
consensus” among international society, organizations and donors, faced an amount of failures 
during the 90’s in countries such as Rwanda, Bosnia and Somalia. This was the moment where 
a growing body of scholars and politicians started to contest this universal vision to build the 
peace.  
In general lines, we can state that the criticism about the liberal peace assumptions 
understands it as counterproductive procedure in war-torn societies. For many scholars, the 
basic principles of the liberal projects – democracy and free trade – are competitive in itself 
and, therefore, they become controversial to societies that just exited a conflictive context. 
Besides that, it is assumed that western countries bring along peacekeeping operations a notion 
of “mission civilisatrice” which enhances a duality between traditional and modern  world. The 
self-confidence of international actors in promoting peace in transitioning societies can be 
attached to a colonialist behavior, which lies on a western superiority framework. Thus, western 
interveners are not concerned about the quality of peace that is being built and, in many cases, 
neglect the relevance and legitimacy of local actors and regional, political as well as social 
practices. When applying a universal notion of peace, they do not give opportunity to the 
implementation of other perspectives. It is in this context that we stress about the Hybrid Peace 
perspective as a growing alternative approach to build the peace in transitioning societies.  
Considering Hybrid Peace as a new form to implement peace in societies after the civil 
conflict, we are then recognizing that there are other actors that play a significant role in 
domestic contexts and can be relevant agents for the promotion of institutional change. Hybrid 
means that local societies will allow the international performance, but still will work through 
internal notion of organizing society and institutions after conflict whatever it may be. In this 
sense, international agents will be primordial actors in the assistance of political and 
institutional knowledge but the main promoters of peace will be the those who have the 
legitimacy of citizens and not only political and economic elites. Local actors are key peace 
promoters because they have cognition of culture, customs and traditions. Thus, in hybrid 
peacebuiding, the bottom up approach is the most significant, given that the institutions will be 
built from below.  
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Therefore, it is important to understand that the Liberal Peace and 
peacebuilding/peacekeeping operations are relevant tools to deliver assistance to war-torn 
societies. Without the UN missions – and other international organizations – national societies 
would be still devastated by the famine and lack of human rights, as well as political disorder. 
However, what is needed to be the focus of the debate is the feasibility of values and 
assumptions which these peace operations bring along. The existence of debates and empirical 
cases that demonstrates the feasibility of Hybrid Peace shows that western perspectives is not 
the exactly “only deal in town” available solution to non-western societies – a good example 
was the in the East Timorese “test case”, where peacebuilding had a profound overlooking in 
the existing political traditional structures  
The Mozambican empirical case, very briefly analyzed, is one example that 
demonstrates that even though political reality did change and a new path to political institutions 
were framed in the country with UNOMOZ operation; some specific dynamics did not change. 
In this sense, peace just reached political elites and urban areas and village population was not 
consulted during the process of peace building. It may be posited, then, that the democracy and 
liberal peace values were implemented but not empirically verified since FRELIMO still have 
preeminence in political spheres and local actors did not take part on the process of state 
building. The liberal western values such as democracy, political freedom of contestation and 
participation, economic rationality within a free and liberalized market do not have much 
meaning in a context where the reality is understood by a non-western driven optic and the 
basic political goods are still scarce.  
Thus, it is important to state that western principles should not be transplanted to 
different realities that did not go through political and economic paths the same way. The 
western experience is not the only global history; there are many different political, economic 
and social paths that must be taken into account when talking about peace. Post-conflict 
societies are, in most of cases, peripheral post-colonial countries which have a strong cultural 
feature that is reproduced and legitimized by the society over the centuries. Taking into account 
these different social contexts and cultural principles may be a key for a stable state 
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